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How useful are probabilistic forecasts of the outcomes of particular situations? Potentially, they 
contain more information than unequivocal forecasts and, as they allow a more realistic 
representation of the relative likelihood of different outcomes, they might be more accurate and 
therefore more useful to decision makers. To test this proposition, I first compared a Squared-
Error Skill Score (SESS) based on the Brier score with an Absolute-Error Skill Score (AESS), 
and found the latter more closely coincided with decision-makers’ interests. I then analysed data 
obtained in researching the problem of forecasting the decisions people make in conflict 
situations. In that research, participants were given lists of decisions that might be made and 
were asked to make a prediction either by choosing one of the decisions or by allocating 
percentages or relative frequencies to more than one of them. For this study I transformed the 
percentage and relative frequencies data into probabilistic forecasts. In most cases the 
participants chose a single decision. To obtain more data, I used a rule to derive probabilistic 
forecasts from structured analogies data, and transformed multiple singular forecasts for each 
combination of forecasting method and conflict into probabilistic forecasts. When compared 
using the AESS, probabilistic forecasts were not more skilful than unequivocal forecasts.  
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 When forecasters are presented with a small set of possible outcomes, some of them might 
prefer to assign probabilities to the options rather than choose one of them. Moreover, it is 
possible that probabilistic forecasts contain more information than unequivocal forecasts and, 
because they allow a more realistic representation of the relative likelihood of different 
outcomes, they might be more useful to decision makers. In order to test this proposition, it is 
necessary to be able to compare the accuracy of the forecasts. Comparisons of accuracy are 
straightforward when each forecaster chooses a single option, but not when they provide 
probabilistic forecasts.  
 
 




The Brier Score was developed by Brier (1950) as a means of assessing the relative accuracy of 
probabilistic forecasts. It is recommended for this purpose by later authors including 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982), and Doggett (1998). The Brier Score is an average 
of the sums of the squared errors of probabilistic forecasts. For one set of probabilities for the 
possible outcomes of a single event, the formula for the Brier Score (BS) is more succinct 
(because the average calculation is avoided) and, arguably, more easily comprehended. On that 
basis the measure is the sum of the squares of the errors, or the dot-product of the error vector 
and itself. The formula for the Brier Score is shown in Exhibit 1.  
 
Exhibit 1 
Brier Score (BS) 
 
( ) ( ) A F A F BS − • − =  
 
F is the vector of probabilistic-forecast (F1,…, Fk) for the k possible outcomes of the forecasting 
objective or target situation. A is the vector of actual outcomes (A1,…, Ak) for the k outcome 
options of the forecasting objective or target situation, where the element representing the actual 
outcome is coded as one and all other elements are coded as zero. 
 
The Brier scores are in the range between zero and two. A completely accurate forecast would 
have a Brier score of zero, and one that was completely wrong would have a Brier score of 
two
1. That is, a forecast that allocates one to the outcome option that actually occurs will have a 
Brier score of zero, irrespective of the number of options. In a case with four possible outcomes, 
the Brier score for such a forecast could be represented as BS(1*,0,0,0) = 0, where the asterisk 
marks the actual outcome. A forecast that allocates 1.00 to any other option will have a BS of 2: 
for example, BS(0*,1,0,0) = 2. The actual-outcome vector would be (1,0,0,0) in both examples.  
                                                           
  2
1 A potential source of confusion is that the Brier score has also been formulated as the squared 
error of the probability assigned to a single event that may or may not occur (e.g. Fuller 2000). 
Using this alternative formulation, a forecast of 0.9 for the chance of rain tomorrow would have 
a BS of 0.01 if it did rain ((0.9-1)
2) and 0.81 if it did not ((0.9-0)
2). With this formulation, the 
Brier score takes values between zero and one.  
Squared-error skill score 
 
The Brier score does not take account of the difficulty of the forecasting problem, or class of 
forecasting problem, that is being considered. To remedy this, one can use a measure that 
provides an assessment of forecast accuracy relative to the accuracy of forecast from a default 
method: the method that is usually used for similar problems, or the most basic method that 
might be used. Such a measure is sometimes referred to as a skill score. The Brier skill score is a 
Squared-Error Skill Score (SESS) and can be defined as shown in Exhibit 2a. 
 
Exhibit 2a 




SESS − =1  
 
The ratio of the Brier Score of the forecast from the method under consideration (BS) to the 
Brier score of the forecast from the default method (BSD) is subtracted from one. This results in 
a skill score with a value of one when the forecast is completely accurate and a lower value 
otherwise. 
 
In the case of forecasting the decisions people make in conflicts, the evidence shows that the 
forecasts of experts using their unaided judgment are no more accurate than chance. A 
reasonable default method for these forecasting problems is therefore the equal-likelihood 
forecast, whereby equal probabilities are allocated to each outcome option. The denominator in 
the Exhibit 2b formula is a simplification of the Brier score calculation for the equal-likelihood 
forecast, and k is the number of outcome options. 
 
Exhibit 2b 
Squared-Error Skill Score (SESS)  
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Problems with squaring 
 
Armstrong (2001) examined the evidence on measures for evaluating forecasting methods and 
found that measures based on squaring forecast errors were unreliable and difficult to interpret. 
On the other hand, he found that the relative absolute error (RAE) measure performed well 
against other error measures. 
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Relative Absolute Errors and the Absolute-Error Skill Score 
 
For probabilistic forecasting, the skill score analogue of the RAE is the Absolute Error Skill 
Score or AESS. It is the sum of the absolute errors of a set of probabilities assigned to the 
outcome options, divided by the sum of the absolute errors from a default method, all subtracted 
from one in order to obtain a skill score that takes a value of one when the forecast is accurate 
and a lower value otherwise. The formula for the AESS is shown in Exhibit 3a. 
 
Exhibit 3a 










U is the unity vector of the same dimension as the probabilistic-forecast vector and the actual-
outcome vector, and FD is the probabilistic-forecast vector from the default method. 
 
As discussed above, in the case of forecasting the decisions people make in conflicts a 
reasonable default method is the equal-likelihood forecast. Analogously with the SESS (Exhibit 
2b), the denominator in the Exhibit 3b formula is a simplification of the sum of the absolute 
errors from the equal-likelihood forecast (|FD – A|•U), and k is the number of outcome options. 
 
Exhibit 3b 
Absolute error skill score (AESS)  
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For the purposes of this paper I examine the use of skill scores in which the default method is 
the equal-likelihood forecast. 
 
 
SESS and AESS compared 
 
A forecast is perfectly accurate if a probability of one is allocated to the outcome that actually 
occurs. Both the SESS and AESS take on a value of one in the case of perfect accuracy. Both 
scores take on a value of zero (no skill) when probabilities are evenly distributed across 
outcome options. 
 
The greatest inaccuracy occurs when there are only two possible outcomes and a probability of 
one is allocated to the outcome that does not occur. In this case, the SESS takes on a value of -
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3.0 and the AESS takes on a value of -1. The forecasting task is harder the more outcome options 
there are, and both skill scores reflect this by giving higher (less negative) scores when the 
number of outcome options is higher. When a probability of one is allocated to an outcome that 
does not occur, the SESS tends asymptotically to -1, and the AESS tends asymptotically to zero, 
as the number of outcome options increases. 
 
The SESS distinguishes among forecasts that are completely inaccurate—those that allocated a 
probability of 0.0 to the outcome that actually occurred—and that have the same number of 
outcome options (k). Forecasts in which probabilities were evenly allocated across outcomes 
that did not occur are rated as having higher (less negative) skill than those in which a high 
probability was allocated to a single outcome that did not occur. The AESS does not distinguish 
among completely inaccurate forecasts for situations with the same number of outcome options. 
 
It seems a reasonable and useful property of a skill score that for a set of forecasts in which a 
probability of 1.0 is allocated to one or other of the outcome options that the average skill score 
should be 0.0 (no skill) if the proportion of accurate forecasts equals 
1/k.. This is the case for the 
AESS, but not for the SESS. 
 
I examined the average SESS and AESS scores for an illustrative set of probabilistic forecasts 
that would have led a decision maker to expect one outcome ahead of others. In other words, 
these are forecasts in which one outcome option is allocated a probability greater than that 
allocated to any of the other options. In Exhibit 4, the first column, headed “Probabilistic 
forecasts”, shows the prbabilities allocated to each of the four possible outcomes. In each 
forecast, the first outcome option has been allocated the largest probability and is shown in bold. 
Columns two to seven of the Exhibit show the average skill score for each probabilistic forecast 
assuming the forecast were repeated many times and the first outcome option occurred with the 
frequency indicated by the percentage figure in the column header. For example, the average 
SESS of a forecast (0.75, 0.09, 0.08, 0.08) repeated many times, with the first outcome occurring 
with a frequency of 90% is 0.89. 
   6
Exhibit 4 
Average skill scores for illustrative forecasts by 
outcome frequencies 
(Forecasts for four outcome options) 
 
  Squared-Error Skill Scores (SESS) 
Probabilistic forecasts 
Frequency with which 1
st outcome occurs * 
(percent) 
  100  90 75 50 25  0 
(1.00, 0.00, 0.00, 0.00)  1.00  0.73  0.33  -0.33  -1.00  -1.67 
(0.95, 0.02, 0.02, 0.01)  1.00  0.75  0.37  -0.25  -0.87  -1.49 
(0.95, 0.05, 0.00, 0.00)  0.99  0.74  0.37  -0.25  -0.87  -1.50 
(0.75,  0.09,  0.08,  0.08)  0.89 0.71 0.44 0.00 -0.44  -0.89 
(0.75, 0.25, 0.00, 0.00)  0.83  0.66  0.39  -0.06  -0.50  -0.94 
(0.50,  0.17,  0.17,  0.16)  0.56 0.47 0.33 0.11 -0.11  -0.33 
(0.30,  0.24,  0.23,  0.23)  0.13 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.05 
  Absolute-Error Skill Scores (AESS) 
Probabilistic forecasts 
Frequency with which 1
st outcome occurs * 
(percent) 
  100  90 75 50 25  0 
(1.00,  0.00,  0.00,  0.00)  1.00 0.87 0.67 0.33 0.00 -0.33 
(0.95, 0.02, 0.02, 0.01) 
(0.95, 0.05, 0.00, 0.00) 
0.93 0.81 0.62 0.31 0.00 -0.31 
(0.75, 0.09, 0.08, 0.08) 
(0.75, 0.25, 0.00, 0.00) 
0.67 0.58 0.44 0.22 0.00 -0.22 
(0.50,  0.17,  0.17,  0.16)  0.33 0.29 0.22 0.11 0.00 -0.11 
(0.30,  0.24,  0.23,  0.23)  0.07 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.02 
 
*  Other outcomes are assumed to occur in equal proportion 
 
In Exhibit 4 I have framed the average skill scores with values of zero (no skill) or less. The 
SESS finds no skill or worse in forecasts for which the outcome option allocated a probability of 
0.75 or greater occurs 50% of the time. An evaluator using the SESS might therefore mistakenly 
reject a method or forecaster as having no skill. The AESS, on the other hand, would not mislead 
an evaluator in this way, and would lead to the sensible conclusion that any set of forecasts 
likely to lead a decision maker to correctly anticipate actual outcomes more frequently than 
chance, should be preferred to the equal-likelihood forecast. 
 
Exhibit 4 also shows that when outcomes occur with equal frequency, the average SESS is 
negative (worse than no skill) if the forecast probabilities are not equal for all outcome options. 
The average AESS does not distinguish between forecasts in such situations and takes on a value 
of zero or “no skill” in all cases.   
 
The average SESS is higher the more closely forecast probabilities match the frequency of actual 
outcomes. In contrast, the average AESS is higher the greater the forecast probability allocated to the outcome that occurs most frequently. Look down the 75% column of Exhibit 4 for an 
illustration of this phenomenon.  
 
In summary, the AESS is a better measure than the SESS for choosing between forecasting 
methods and forecasters when forecasts are in the form of probabilities allocated to outcome 
options. While the SESS makes more distinctions than the AESS, these distinctions are unlikely 
to help an evaluator choose the best method. Most importantly, the SESS can lead an evaluator 
to reject a useful method as having no skill and should therefore be avoided.  
 
 
AESS and percent correct forecasts compared 
 
Research on forecasting decisions in conflict situations has to date compared forecasting 
methods using the the relative percentage of correct forecasts from the methods. Chance 
accuracy—the accuracy one could expect to achieve from choosing a decision at random from a 
finite set of possible decisions—has been used to make the broad distinction between useful and 
invalid methods. The AESS as defined in this paper measures the skill of the forecaster or 
method relative to chance and so the AESS should lead to similar assessments of the relative and 
absolute merits of methods. Indeed it is desirable that it should do so. 
 
To determine whether use of the AESS would lead to similar assessments of conflict forecasting 
methods as percent correct forecasts, I calculated probabilistic forecasts from the singular 
forecasts obtained in research on forecasting decisions in conflicts. For each combination of 
method tested and conflict situation used in the research, I calculated probabilities for each 
decision option from the relative frequency of singular forecasts for that option. The result of 
these calculations is shown in Exhibit 5.  
 
Exhibit 5 
Accuracy, and skill of multiple singular forecasts transformed into probabilistic forecasts 
for each combination of method and conflict situation * 
Percent correct forecasts; AESS; (number of forecasts) 
Chance
% AESS n% AESS n% AESS n% AESS n% AESS n
Artists Protest 17 5 -0.14 (39) 10 -0.08 (20) 6 -0.13 (17) 27 0.13 (11) 29 0.14 (14)
Distribution Channel 33 5 -0.27 (42) 38 -0.18 (17) 23 -0.13 (13) 50 0.22 (12) 75 0.67 (12)
55% Pay Plan 25 27 0.02 (15) 18 -0.09 (11) 29 0.06 (17) 57 0.43 (14) 60 0.47 (10)
Nurses Dispute 33 68 0.52 (22) 73 0.60 (15) 50 0.25 (14) 57 0.36 (14) 82 0.73 (22)
Personal Grievance 25 44 0.26 (9) 31 0.08 (13) 43 0.24 (7) 36 0.14 (14) 60 0.47 (10)
Telco Takeover 25 10 -0.20 (10) 0 -0.33 (8) 0 -0.33 (7) 8 -0.22 (12) 40 0.20 (10)
Water Dispute 33 45 0.18 (11) 50 0.25 (8) 75 0.63 (8) 92 0.88 (12) 90 0.85 (10)
Zenith Investment 33 29 -0.07 (21) 36 0.04 (14) 22 -0.17 (18) 38 0.06 (8) 59 0.38 (17)
Average, unweighted  28 29 0.04 (169) 32 0.04 (106) 31 0.05 (101) 46 0.25 (97) 62 0.49 (105)
Simulated interaction
novices experts experts experts novices
Unaided judgment Game theorist Structured analogies
 
* Data from Green (2005), Green and Armstrong (2007a), and Green and Armstrong (2007b). 
 
The percentage of correct forecasts from unaided judgment by novices and experts, and from 
game theory experts, was close to the average value for chance of 28%. Exhibit 5 shows that for 
those same methods, the average AESS figures for the probabilistic versions of the forecasts 
were close to zero. Recall that an AESS of zero indicates that the forecasting method has not 
  7shown skill, which is consistent with the analysis by percentage of correct forecasts. Forecasts 
from structured analogies and simulated interaction were, on average, substantially more 
accurate than chance and the AESS figures of 0.25 and 0.48 are positive and well above zero, 
thereby providing a consistent assessment.  
 
Moreover, Exhibit 5 illustrates that the AESS is a better measure of method or forecaster skill 
than percent correct. The percent correct figures convey no information about skill relative to 
the default method, in this case chance or random selection. The AESS figures, on the other 
hand, can be interpreted as the error reduction as a proportion of potential error reduction, or the 
extent to which the skill of the forecaster or method has reduced residual error. In mathematical 












where Pr(f*) is the probability assigned to the actual outcome or the proportion of forecasts that 
were accurate, and k is the number of outcome options and 1/k is chance accuracy. 
 
Careful readers will notice that this formula does not apply to the Distribution Channel conflict. 
That is because participants in the original research were offered four choices, one of which was 
“either A or B”. In the papers reporting the result for this conflict, the findings were adjusted to 
account for the fact that there were in effect only three real choices and where respondents opted 
for the either A or B option, their response was coded as half right (0.5). I did not make 
equivalent adjustments to the AESS calculations here. 
 
 
Assessment of probabilistic forecasts obtained in conflict forecasting research 
 
Green and Armstrong (2007) described an experiment in which novices (university students) 
were asked either to pick the most likely decision, or to assign relative frequencies to each 
possible decision, in a set of from 3 to 6 possible decisions. The authors converted the relative 
frequency forecasts into singular forecasts—the most probable decision was used as the singular 
forecast—in order to compare accuracy with the singular forecasts. On that basis, there was on 
average no difference in accuracy between the two sets of forecasts, and little difference from 
chance accuracy (Exhibit 6). 
 
I converted the singular and frequencies forecasts into probabilistic forecasts in order to assess 
whether the frequencies forecasts were the product of more skill than they appeared to be on the 
basis of percent correct forecasts. They were not. As Exhibit 6 shows, when converted to 
probabilistic forecasts, neither the singular nor frequencies forecasts exhibited any useful level 
of skill (mean AESS of 0.04 and 0.05 respectively) and the conclusion was the same as when 
they were both assessed as singular forecasts. 
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Exhibit 6 
Accuracy and skill of novices’ singular and relative frequency forecasts  
treated as probabilistic forecasts * 
Percent correct forecasts; mean AESS; (number of forecasts)  
 
  Chance Singular    Frequencies 
 %  %  AESS  n   %  AESS  n 
  55% Pay Plan  25  9  -0.19  (11)    0  -0.22  (12) 
  Artists Protest  17  0  -0.20  (11)    10  -0.06  (10) 
  Personal Grievance  25  46  0.25  (13)    11  -0.08  (9) 
  Distribution Channel  33  38  -0.17  (13)    23  0.07  (13) 
  Zenith Investment  33  42  0.17  (12)    40  0.02  (10) 
  Telco Takeover  25  25  0.00  (12)    50  0.03  (12) 
  Nurses Dispute  33  58  0.38  (12)    64  0.28  (11) 
  Water Dispute  33 42 0.08 (12)   67 0.36 (12)
Averages (unweighted)   28 33  0.04  (96)    33  0.05  (89) 
                
* Data from Green and Armstrong (2007a) 
 
 
Aside from the study just described that directly compared singular and relative frequency 
forecasts, other conflict forecasting studies gave all participants the opportunity either to choose 
what they considered the most likely decision from a list, or to assign percentage likelihood 
figures. In practice, the overwhelming majority of respondents picked single decisions. For this 
paper, I converted the small number of percentage likelihood forecasts into probabilistic 
forecasts and calculated skill scores (Exhibit 8).  
 
I also calculated skill scores from the conflict forecasting data in two other ways. The first of 
these was to set the option (decision) with the highest probability to one, and other options to 
zero. The second was to use the information that structured-analogies participants provided 
about their analogies to derive probabilities using the following rule. The probability of each 
decision is equal to the highest rating given to an analogy that suggests the decision, plus one-
third of the sum of ratings given to any other analogies that suggest that decision, all divided by 
the sum of these aggregates across all decisions. Decisions not suggested by any of a 
participant’s analogies are given a probability of zero.  
 
For example, assume a fictitious participant used structured analogies to forecast a conflict with 
three decision options. Exhibit 7 shows the similarity ratings he provided (out of ten) for his 
three analogies. The ratings are shown in the columns corresponding to the decision options (A, 
B, or C) suggested by those analogies. The bottom line of the Exhibit shows the probabilities, 
derived using the rule just described, for the decision options. 
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Exhibit 7 
Illustration of method for deriving probabilities  
from structured analogies data using a rule 
 
 Decision  options   
 A  B  C  Sum 
Analogy 1 rating    7     
Analogy 2 rating      5   
Analogy 3 rating      3   
Probability of decision 










(5 + 3/3) 
/13 = 
0.46 
(7 + 0/3) +  
(5 + 3/3) = 
13 
 
Where participants considered that their analogies suggested more than one decision, the ratings 
were ascribed to each of the decisions that were suggested. In practice, there were never more 
than two decisions suggested by a single analogy and so, in such cases, the ratings were counted 
twice. 
Exhibit 8 
Skill scores for cases in which solo experts provided probabilistic forecasts, 
by derivation of probabilities
 a and forecasting method 
 
  
Absolute-Error Skill Scores (AESS) 
 















  Artists Protest  -0.20 -0.14  
   -0.20 -0.20  
   -0.20 -0.20  
       Average  -0.20 -0.18  
       Average 2   
    
  Distribution Channel  0.25   
   -0.50 1.00  -0.05   0.20 
   -0.50 1.00  -0.13   0.40 
   0.25 0.14  -0.11
       Average  -0.50 0.75 -0.09 0.14 0.16
       Average 2  0.25 0.14 -0.11
    
  55% Pay Plan  -0.33 -0.33 -0.33
   -0.33 -0.33  
       Average  -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.33
       Average 2  -0.33 -0.33 -0.33
    
  Personal Grievance  -0.33 -0.33 -0.33
   1.00 0.73  0.20
   1.00 0.47  
       Average  1.00 0.34 0.47 0.20 -0.07
       Average 2  0.34 0.20 -0.07  11
    
  Nurses Dispute  1.00 0.40  
   1.00 0.25    1.00 
       Average  1.00 1.00 0.40  1.00
       Average 2   
    
  Telco Takeover  -0.33 -0.33  -0.33   -0.33 
   -0.33 -0.27  
   -0.33 -0.33  -0.33
   -0.33 0.20  
   0.20    -0.33 
       Average  -0.33 -0.33 -0.13   -0.33
       Average 2  -0.33 -0.33 -0.33
    
  Water Dispute  1.00 0.40  
   -0.50 -0.13  
   0.00   
       Average  0.25 0.14  
       Average 2   
    
  Zenith Investment  -0.50 1.00 -0.05  0.55
   1.00 0.70  1.00
       Average  -0.50 1.00 -0.05   0.78
       Average 2  1.00 0.70 1.00
    
  Total Average 
c 0.05 0.40 0.06   0.20
     Conflicts, number  8 6 8   6
     Observations, number  14 11 14   11
  Total Average 2 
c 0.19 0.08 0.03
     Conflicts, number  5 5  5
     Observations, number  6 6  6
    
  Notes:  
 
Figures in italics are excluded from the calculation of "Average 2" and "Total Average 2" 
in all cases, and from "Average" and "Total Average" in some.  The criterion for exclusion 
was lack of a matching figure from the same method but an alternative derivation.  
a  For a single participant for a single conflict, the probabilities from which the AESSs were 
calculated were derived in three different ways: 1/ see note b; 2/ the participants' own 
probabilities were derived from their percentage likelihood figures; 3/ probabilities were 
derived from participants' analogy decisions and ratings using the rule described in 
Exhibit 7. In all cases, forecasts of C for Distribution Channel were re-coded, with 0.5 
allocated to option-A and 0.5 to option-B. 
b  When a participant allocated the highest percentage likelihood for a conflict to a single 
option, that option was re-coded as one and the rest were recoded as zero. When 
participants' percentage likelihoods were inconsistent with their own analogies, any 
forecasts from those percentages were coded to the method “unaided judgment” and, 
where this was reasonable, single forecasts were derived from the analogies. 
c  Means of conflict averages. 
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Exhibit 8 includes only forecasts for which participants provided probabilities for several 
outcomes. Few such forecasts were provided. Consequently, interpretation of the findings 
shown in Exhibit 8 can only be tentative. As measured by the AESS, the assessment of the skill 
of the unaided judgement and structured analogies methods is consistent with comparisons of 
percent correct. That is, the structured analogies method was on average more skilful than 
unaided judgment.  
 
It is not clear that probabilistic forecasts were more skilful than forecasts in which the 
participants’ most-likely decision options were set to one and other options to zero. The 
probabilistic unaided-judgement forecasts showed more (but still negative) skill than did the 
one-option-set-to-one forecasts, but this was not the case for structured analogies forecasts. The 
rule for deriving probabilistic forecasts from participants’ analogies data offered no increase in 
skill relative to first-choice-set-to-one or relative to participants’ probabilities.  
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
The Absolute-Error Skill Score (AESS) provides a useful measure for assessing the skill of a 
forecaster or forecasting method. It is intuitive in that a score of 1 indicates perfect accuracy, a 
score of zero indicates no skill compared to the default method, and a negative score indicates 
the forecasting method is worse than the default method. The AESS is easier to interpret and 
better behaved than the Brier skill score or Squared Error Skill Score (SESS). 
 
Using the AESS and the probabilistic data from my conflict forecasting research, I could find no 
evidence in that probabilistic forecasts tend to be more accurate than unequivocal forecasts. 
Nevertheless, decision makers may find a forecast that provides information on the relative 
likelihood of different outcomes to be more useful than an unequivocal forecast. I did not 
investigate that possibility. 
 
My comparison of probabilistic and unequivocal forecasts was limited in the amount of data 
available and the type of forecasting problem that the data were drawn from. Further research on 
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